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Employee's Participation 
in Management 
International Expériences and the 
Prospects for Canada 
Chris A. Jecchinis 
The expériences of certain successful West European prac-
tices in employee's participation within undertaking recommend 
the establishment of complementary institional arrangments in 
the existing system of labour-management relations in Canada 
which, at the présent, is based only on the institution of collec-
tive bargaining. 
Some countries of the Western World, including Canada, hâve been 
experiencing since the middle 1960's, acute industrial conflict and poor pro-
ductivity performance at a time when industrial peace and increased pro-
ductivity are needed for the concerted effort against persisting stagflation. 
The hard facts are startling as well as convincing. The number and frequen-
cy of strikes, lockouts, and other forms of stoppages hâve been increasing 
at an alarming rate, especially in the stratégie sectors of the economy, and 
the rate of productivity growth leaves much to be desired. 
Productivity is not only being affected adversely by the direct loss of 
production as a resuit of the man-days lost from stoppages, but also 
through various slow-downs, increased absenteeism, poor workmanship, 
and the damage of equipment and materials. The explanation that some ex-
perts offer for the increased strife, is that under the pressures of inflation, 
labour and management hâve become more inflexible in their respective 
positions, while others, tend to attribute most of the industrial unrest of ré-
cent years to leftwing militancy. However, most experts agrée that the 
record of industrial disputes in more than a décade now, indicates, first, 
that increased unrest has been with us long before the inflation pressures of 
* ORRIS, A., Professor of Labour Economies and Industrial Relations, Lakehead 
University, Thunder Bay, Ontario, and Member of the Ontario Public Service Labour Rela-
tions Tribunal. 
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récent years, and second, that the militant action on the part of trade 
unions, does not necessarily correspond to leftwing political agitation. The 
record of industrial disputes for instance of Australia, Canada, Ireland, and 
the United States, which idealogically hâve moderate to conservative trade 
unions, is as bad as that of Italy, where communists and leftwing socialists 
dominate most of the trade unions. On the other hand, the strike record of 
France, where also the communists dominate most of the important trade 
unions, is nearly as good as the low strike record of Japan, the Scandana-
vian countries and Germany. (See Tables 1 and 2). 
The answer to thèse inconsistencies can be found in the underlying 
causes ofconflict, and the adversary aspects of industrial relations Systems 
which are based on labour-management confrontation rather than coopéra-
tion, not in the ideological orientation of the trade unions. International ex-
périences indicate that radicals take advantage of discontent, but they do 
not cause it. In such cases, labour management différences over rémunéra-
tion and fringe benefits are accentuated by mutual intense distrust, and thus 
their respective positions become more rigid. It is then almost impossible to 
corne to an easy and reasonable wage settlement or even to find mutually ac-
ceptable solutions for problems of mutual concern. 
It has become obvious in the last décade that the conventional collec-
tive bargaining System alone, cannot deal effectively with many of the com-
plicated problems created by transfers of production and the uncontrolled 
introduction of technological change and automation, (which hâve been ac-
companied by increased structural unemployment), the frustration and 
aliénation of important segments of the labour force (as a resuit of the 
détérioration of the working environment), the development of a strong 
sensé of social justice and the search of fulfillment, especially among the 
younger génération of workers. What is questioned, therefore, is not the 
contribution of collective bargaining to wage fixing and the improvement of 
living standards, but its inability to cope with the multiplicity of workplace 
problems which hâve increased conflict and decreased productivity. The 
solution of thèse problems requires periodic, if not constant, consultation 
and agreement between labour and management, which the arrangements 
of conventional contract negotiation (once every two or three years) cannot 
possibly provide. 
Expérience has shown that the solution lies in the overall improvement 
of labour-management relations and the development of complementary in-
stitutional arrangements, not in the abolition of the collective bargaining 
System, which, in an atmosphère of good labour-management relations, can 
still contribute to reasonable wage settlements. A comparison study of the 
TABLE 1 
Industrial Disputes - Some International Comparisons Average for 
Days Lost Per 1,000 People Employed 5 years 5 years 10' • > * * " * 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1968 1973 1973 
Australia* 480 410 360 320 460 860 1,040 1,300 840 1,030 406 1,014 710 
Belgium 250 40 320 90 230 100 830+ 720 180 500 186 466 326 
Canada 560 790 1,570 1,200 1,670 2,550 2,190t 800 1,420 1,650 1,158 1,722 1,440 
Denmark& 30 400 30 20 20 80 170 30 40 4,020 100 868 484 
Finland 80 20 150 410 250 200 270t 3,300t 530 2,510 182 1,362 772 
France 280 100 240 430 (a) 200 180| 430 300f 330 262(11) 288 277(c) 
Fédéral Republic 
of Germany ... ... ... 30 ... 20 10 330 ... 40 6 80 43 
India 560 470 890 1,270 1,150 1,270 l,440t l,020f l,300t (a) 868 1,257 l,041(c) 
Ireland 1,620 1,720 1,420 520 910 2,170 490 670 600t 420 1,238 870 1,054 
Italy 1,270 540 1,710 580 930 4,160 1,730 1,060 1,680 2,280 1,006 2,182 1,594 
Japan 190 360 170 100 160 200 200 310 270 210 196 238 217 
Netherlands 20 30 10 ... 10 10 140 50 70 330 14 120 67 
New Zealand 160 50 230 320 310 300 470 370 320 560 214 404 309 
Norway — — ... 10 10 ... 70 10 ... 10 4 18 11 
Sweden** 10 ... 110 ... ... 30 40 240 — — 24 62 43 
Switzerland ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 10 — ... ... 2 1 
United Kingdom 170 220 170 220 370 520 740 1,190+ 2,160t 570 230 1,036 633 
United StatesB 850 860 880 1,430 1,590 1,390 2,210 l,620t 870 770 1,122 1,372 1,247 
* Including electricity, and gas >, excluding communication • (a) Figures not available. 
£ Preliminary figures. (b) Average for 1964-67 only. 
t Revised figures. (c) Average for 1964-67 and 1969-73 only 
& Manufacturing only (d) Average for 1969-72 only. 
** AH industries included. (e) Average for 1964-72 only. 
B Figures cover also electricity , gas and sanitary services. Note Where no figure is given the number of days lost per 1,000 is less than 
Reproduced from the Décembre 1974 issue of the U.K. Department of Employment Gazette. 
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TABLE 2 
Days Lost Per Thousand Workers Employed in Mining, 
Manufacturing, Construction and Transport 
1972-1975 
Country 1972 1973 1974 1975* 
Australia1 880 1,080 2,670 1,390 
Belgium 190 520 340 340 
Canada 1,420 1,660 2,590 2,840 
Denmark2 40 4,440 330 190 
Finland 520 2,470 460 300 
France 300 330 250 390 
Germany (F.R.) 10 40 60 110 
India 1,300 1,330 2,480 n.a. 
Ireland 600 420 1,260 810 
Italy 1,670 2,480 1,800 1,640 
Japan 270 210 450 400 
Netherlands 70 330 
- -
New Zealand 300 530 360 380 
Norway - 10 490 10 
Sweden 10 10 30 20 
Switzerland - 0 - -
United Kingdom 2,160 2,570 1,270 540 
United States3 860 750 1,480 n.a. 
* Preliminary figures 
- Less than five days lost per 1,000 workers employed 
n.a. Not available 
1 Including electricity and gas; excluding communication 
2 Manufacturing only 
3 Including electricity, gas and sanitary services 
Source: I.L.O. 
industrial relations System of various Western World countries, and their 
respective records of strikes, productivity, and overall économie perfor-
mance, recommend the serious considération of introducing some com-
plementary institutional arrangements to the existing collective bargaining 
System and arbitration procédures, which should facilitate labour-
management coopération for the solution of problems of mutual concern. 
This would in turn reduce conflict, increase productivity, and improve the 
chances of reasonable wage and salary settlements. 
Ail such arrangements center around some from of employées* par-
ticipation in management and come under the gênerai category of industrial 
democracy. Although thèse institutional arrangements for participation dif-
fer in scope and functions, they hâve similar basic aims. 
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I THE AIMS OF PARTICIPATION 
It has been suggested that workers' participation reduced to its simplest 
form "is merely a question of how to secure a bigger say for the workers in 
the détermination of the conditions governing their every-day lives"1. 
Although this is true concerning the initial intention, the actual practice of 
any form of participation indicates a broader application of its benefits. Ex-
périence has shown for instance, that successful participation présupposes a 
situation in which the many related but separate interests that exist within 
an enterprise hâve been maintained in some kind of equilibrium and in har-
mony with the interests of society as a whole. 
In the process of maintaining the equilibrium of the separate interests 
within an undertaking, the recognized ideological and utilitarian aims of 
participation must be fully or partly satisfied. Ideological aims in this con-
text reflect a scale of ethical and cultural values while utilitarian aims reflect 
a scale of functional values, i.e. maximization of profits in Western coun-
tries and plan fulfillment in Marxist countries2. 
More specifically, the aims of participation which apply to both the 
Western and Marxist countries and to a certain extent the developing coun-
tries, are the following: 
In the category of ideological aims, 
(a) humanising work, i.e. ensuring the human dignity of the worker 
by making hin/her feel that he/she is not a mère part of the machine, but a 
participant in décisions affecting his/her work and working environment. 
(b) promoting industrial democracy, i.e. limiting the absolute 
authority of employers by granting the workers a share in the management 
of industry and improving thus labour relations, and 
(c) familiarising the workers with the various aspects of the enterprise 
and thus facilitating their social promotion. 
In the category of utilitarian aims, 
a) raising the productivity of labour and production by increasing the 
workers* material interests in the results of their work and making them feel 
more responsible for it, i.e. re-inforcing their work incentives. 
i KERSTEN, Otto, in Christer Asplund's Some Aspects of Workers' Participation, 
I.C.F.T.U., Brussels, 1972. 
2 "Glossary of Workers Participation", International Educational Materials Ex-
change, I.I.L.S., Geneva, 1972. 
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b) avoiding industrial conflicts and preserving social equilibrium by 
working out décisions affecting the workers in collaboration with their 
représentatives, and 
c) helping to adjust the industrial relations system to changes: this is 
important in new advance branches of industry or in declining industries3. 
Some of the aforementioned aims are objected to by certain trade 
union groups and employer organizations on ideological or practical 
grounds, nevertheless, they hâve become significantly the accepted reality in 
a considérable number of countries and the expressed goal of many others. 
The realization, however, of any combination of agreed ideological and 
utilitarian aims, dépends on a number of important factors, one of which is 
the désire and the ability of workers to participate effectively in the adopted 
system of participation. This requires on the part of the workers' représen-
tatives the acquisition of the necessary information and certain technical 
skills as well as the development of a sensé of coopération and social 
responsibility. 
THE LEVELS, STRUCTURE, AND FUNCTIONS 
OF PARTICIPATIVE INSTITUTIONS 
Many developed as well as some developing countries hâve established 
or plan to introduce workers' participation by law or collective agreements, 
but the degree and scope of participation and the type of institutions that 
hâve developed accordingly, vary from country to country and in some 
cases from industry to industry. However, in spite of this diversity, there are 
certain institutional and functional similarities that can be distinguished, at 
least in most of the developed and in some of the developing countries. 
Thèse similarities are to be found especially in the so-called 
"représentative" or lower level institutions of participation which are con-
cerned with the three main aspects of labour-management coopération i.e. 
information, consultation and approval. 
LOWER LEVEL PARTICIPATION: CONSULTATIVE BODIES 
The most common institutions of labour-management coopération and 
consultation that hâve developed at the level of the undertakings, mainly in 
the European countries are usually called "works' councils", "works' com-
3 Ibid. 
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mittees" and in some cases, "trade union committees" (the marxist coun-
tries). The works' councils and similar institutions, are in fact, labour-
management bodies where problems of mutual concern are presented and 
discussed with the purpose of either reaching a consensus or "influencing" 
décisions. The range of subjects that such bodies may deal with varies, but 
in most cases they include the following: 
1. Production, including targets and results of previous periods, cur-
rent targets in relation to orders or plans, new methods and techniques, 
equipment and materials, defective work and wastage, customer complaints 
and public relations, reports on workers' suggestions and proposed innova-
tions. 
2. Finance and Business, including a survey and explanation of the 
undertaking's financial statements, an examination of future orders or 
plans, an examination of the compétitive position of the enterprise in the 
particular industry and abroad, and the possible effect of the existing 
économie situation. 
3. Personnel, including manpower planning and training, top 
management changes, prospective hirings, redundancies and turnover, and 
inter-enterprise communications. 
4. Welfare, including safety and health, heating and ventilation, can-
teens and restaurants, washrooms, vacation plans and holiday plan, 
transportation facilities, housing, benevolent funds, sports activities and 
entertainment4. 
The right of workers' représentatives to a say in thèse matters varies 
from country to country and in some cases from industry to industry, but 
there are some considérable similarities. In most cases for instance, the 
works' councils hâve the right to receive information in some or the majori-
ty of the forementioned subject matters. 
Most works' councils and similar bodies hâve no right of "codecision" 
and they are limited therefore, to some form of ' 'coopération". "In prac-
tice, this means the right to protest against décisions, to make suggestions or 
to be consulted"5. 
4 This analysis is an extended version of the one that has been made by Everett 
KASSALOW in his book Trade Unions and Industrial Relations: An International Com-
parison, New York, 1969. 
5 ASPLUND, C , Some Aspects of Workers' Participation, I.C.F.T.U., Brussels, 
1972, p. 13. 
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The degree of influence that workers can exert on management through 
the works' councils or similar bodies can be considérable depending on a 
number of factors. It dépends for instance, on the strength of the trade 
union supporting the workers' représentatives, the kind of labour manage-
ment relations and coopération that hâve developed at the particular enter-
prise, and the ability ofthe workers' représentatives to utilise effectively the 
information received in developing convincing arguments in their discus-
sions with management. 
The Spécial Problems of Developing Countries 
For a variety of reasons the establishment of works' councils or similar 
bodies in the private sector of the developing countries has been slow with 
the exception of Algeria, Tanzania and Zambia which hâve adopted in ré-
cent years législation setting-up works councils and similar bodies with wide 
powers. 
The main reasons for the slow progress achieved so far in introducing 
workers' participation in the private sector of most developing countries, 
are to be found perhaps not so much in the ideological résistance of trade 
unions, but rather to the résistance of management and the inability of 
trade unions to press effectively for the establishment of participative 
bodies at the level of the undertakings. With few exceptions, trade unions in 
the developing countries are small compared to the total labour force, poor 
in finance and administration, and therefore, hâve weak bargaining "mus-
cle" in their relations with the employers, and little influence with govern-
ments. An additional problem is that of poor éducation-, it is questionable 
therefore, whether adéquate numbers of workers can be found at the pré-
sent time who can qualify for any level of participation6. 
Trade Union Committees in Marxist Economies 
In the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern European countries, the économie 
reforms introduced in the middle 1960's which resulted in increased 
autonomy for undertakings, "through a more flexible system of decen-
tralised planning it was accompanied by an expansion of workers' participa-
tion in the management of production and in numerous décisions, in par-
ticular by the granting of increased powers to the trade union committee of 
an undertaking or establishment". 
6 "Industrial Democracy" I.C.F.T.U. Eleventh World Congress (Mexico, O.F. 17-25 
Oct. 1975) I.C.F.T.U. Brussels, 1975, p. 21. 
7 Labour-Management Relations Séries No. 48, p. 17. 
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The trade union commitîees in the Soviet Union and other Eastern 
European countries had for many years exercised important functions, par-
ticularly as regards to dismissals, welfare, safety, and health. The functions 
and importance of thèse committees hâve now been enlarged through col-
lective agreements which are concluded at the level of the undertaking bet-
ween the trade union committee and the management of the undertaking. 
The new collective agreements in the U.S.S.R. corne under the régula-
tions governing the rights of factory workers or the establishment of trade 
union committees, adopted in September 1971. In accordance with the new 
Statute on the rights of local trade union committees of primary organisa-
tions, jointly with the management of enterprises, they détermine the direc-
tions and the ratios of spending incentives funds, and set the size of bonuses 
for undustrial and office workers and the terms on which they are to be 
paid. They hâve the right to hear reports from the management of the enter-
prise on how it is going to improve the working conditions of employées, 
and the cultural and other day to day services that are provided for workers. 
The trade union committees can raise also before appropriate organisations 
the question of dismissing or punishing members of the management who 
do not fulfill the commitments provided for by the collective agreements, or 
hâve engaged in red tape. Furthermore, the management of an enterprise 
cannot dismiss any industrial or office worker without the trade union com-
mittee's consent8. 
Higher Level Participation: Codecision Bodies 
In 1970, the Fédéral Republic of Germany was the only country in 
Western Europe where workers représentatives had seats on private Com-
pany boards. Today the company laws also of Austria, Denmark, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden provide for such représenta-
tion. 
In France, the "co-surveillance" has been suggested by the Sudreau 
Commission as the final goal of enterprise reform. In Italy, workers do not 
participate in management organs the same way as that of the aforemen-
tioned countries, nevertheless, the trade unions share responsibility with 
management for investment policy of certain big privately owned enter-
prises within the framework of spécifie collective agreements. In the United 
Kingdom the Government has announced plans for appropriate législation 
8 From the Soviet response to the Questionnaire prepared by the I.L.O. Workers' 
Education Branch. 
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in order to provide for worker directors on the boards of large British com-
panies, and the debate at the présent has centered around the question of 
workers' représentation. (In other words, the percentage of workers' 
représentation in the board of directors and whether thèse représentatives 
would be appointed by the trade unions or elected by the personnel of the 
undertaking.) 
In most cases of the introduced or proposed législation, workers, hâve 
or would hâve only a minority représentation as that compared to the 
shareholders. A noteable exception is that of the Coal, Iron and Steel in-
dustries of the Fédéral Republic ofGermany where workers' représentatives 
hâve parity représentation in the Supervisory Boards. The new 1976 act on 
"codetermination" improves somewhat on workers previous représentation 
in the supervisory boards of other major industries which employ 2,000 or 
more employées. Out of the members of a supervisory board for example, 
consisting of 20 members, seven of the ten employée représentatives must be 
employed in the company, whilst three of them, for which only trade unions 
hâve the right of proposai, can corne from outside the company. The Chair-
man and the Vice-chairman of the Supervisory Board are elected by the 
supervisory board members with a majority of two thirds. If this majority is 
not obtained, the shareholders' side elects the Chairman and the employées 
side the Vice-chairman. In gênerai, the Chairman would hâve the possibility 
to bring about a décision of the board if there is a stalemate situation. In 
this case, a second voting takes place, in which he has the right of two 
votes9. The shareholders hâve thus retained the control of the supervisory 
boards. 
The employers in Germany, and more specifically the Confédération of 
German Employers' Association (BDA), hâve always supported ail forms 
of codetermination below the Supervisory Board level and coopération with 
the trade unions and the Government in advisory and decision-making 
bodies entrusted with the task of contributing to the solution of social and 
économie problems. "The BDA acknowledges as the fundamental principle 
of the social constitution that two partners enjoying equal rights face each 
other and are independent of each other. From this advocacy of a part-
nerlike ordering of the economy follows the readiness to cooperate with the 
employées so as to serve the économie and social peace, as it is called in the 
statement of the Works Council Act. The BDA acquiesces in a participation 
of the employées in social questions and the coopération of employers and 
employées in économie problems"10. 
9 The Act on Codetermination of 1976, Fédéral Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 
Bonn, 1976. 
10 Germany Reports, Labour Market and Labour and Management, Press and Informa-
tion Office of the Fédéral Government, Bonn, 1969, p. 23. 
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Nevertheless, the employer organisation hâve always objected to the ef-
forts of the trade unions and political parties to extend employée influence 
in the Supervisory Boards of private companies. The iack of résistance in 
the introduction of the parity représentation in the supervisory boards of 
the steel, iron, and coal was due perhaps to the fact that at the time when 
the law was being debated, the owners of those basic industries were in the 
défensive because of their association with the Nazi régime before and dur-
ing World War IL "Historically, the existence of the scheme is explicable in 
that it was accepted by the owners at a time when they had in effect been 
dispossessed and were discredited, and a System of parity représentation on 
the board seemed to them préférable to outright nationalisation, probably 
without compensation. The positive reasons for the scheme, also, were 
grounded in the events of the time viz that it would enable the unions and 
employées to supervise the activities of the companies so as to ensure they 
did not give political support to any possible revival of the Nazi party"11. 
Although parity représentation in the supervisory boards of the basic 
industries has not created any major problems, and the reformers can point 
with satisfaction at the good to excellent performance and profitability of 
those industries, the employer organisations hâve objected to the extension 
of the principle in other industries. The new act of 1976 is in fact a political 
compromise worked out in Parliament, which has taken into considération 
some of the employer objections. Nevertheless, the BDA, as a matter of 
principle and perhaps for tactical reasons, still objects to the new législation. 
A document prepared by the BDA includes the following statement: 
"Although with the acknowledgement of the right of the final décision 
of the owners bearing the financial risks, the basic concept of our économie 
and social order has not been put into question, the practical application of 
the législation will give rise to serious problems. Our objections in this 
respect relate to the functioning of the company, to the future implications 
on our social and économie order, and to the constitutional aspects"12. 
On the other hand, the trade unions and more specifically the German 
Trade Unions Fédération (DGB), hâve expressed dissatisfaction over the 
new act which has introduced less than parity représentation in the super-
visory boards. Trade union researchers and some independent observers 
hâve expressed also fears that in the implementation of the new act, 
employée représentation would be diluted, because the électoral System as 
il Davies, P.L., Industhal Democracy: European Expérience, H.M. Stationary Office, 
London, 1976, pp. 78-79. 
12 B.D.A., Codetermination in Germany, Cologne, April 1976. 
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well as the composition of the employées' side, will give middle manage-
ment (which represents the interests of the owners) undue influence over the 
élection of salaried employées' représentatives and a good chance to be 
elected in the supervisory board as employée représentatives, although in 
fact they may serve the interests of the shareholders. 
It will take perhaps more than two years to assess properly the new 
German codetermination act, but if the past is to be an indication, the 
scheme will probably meet eventually with considérable success, because 
both sides hâve demonstrated the willingness and the capacity to adapt 
themselves to the needs of the times and contribute thus to économie stabili-
ty and social progress. 
The trade unions hâve always acted with considérable modération. 
Although very well organised and financially independent, they hâve chosen 
the path to coopération for the solution of problems of mutual concern, 
and hâve been making reasonable wage demands which relate to productivi-
ty and the capacity of the economy to pay. The strike is rarely used as a 
means of achieving the desired ends. Instead, they make use of the extensive 
arbitration services provided by the Government, and the continuous 
dialogue that exists with management inside and outside the enterprise. 
The IGM (Métal Workers' Fédération) which is the biggest and most 
important trade union organisation of the D.G.B., with 2,460,000 
members, has declared the following: 
"Because a strike is a weapon to be used only in extrême circumstances, and 
because a strike in the métal industry may hâve particularly far-reaching ef-
fects on the economy as a whole, the IGM constitution créâtes the following 
safety measures regarding work stoppage: 
1. Each strike must be approved by the Executive Council. 
2. Such consent can only be given if a minimum of 75 percent of the 
•organised workers involved hâve voted in favour of the strike in a 
secret ballot (Urabstimmung), which first has to be approved by 
the Executive Council too. This refusai is automatic if less than 
75% hâve voted for the strike. 
3. If negotiations or other circumstances change the situation during 
a strike, the Executive Council may only continue the strike if at 
least 75% of the workers organised by the trade union concerned 
vote to do so in a secret ballot"13. 
Reasonable attitudes hâve prevailed also among employée représen-
tatives at ail levels of codetermination, including those industries where 
13 I.G.M., Meet IG Meta//, Frankfurt, 1974, p. 10. 
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there is parity représentation in the supervisory boards. Foreign observers 
hâve found that even in the cases of parity représentation, the conventional 
business interests hâve not been endangered14. In other words, the impor-
tant factor which contributes to the success of the codetermination System 
in Germany is that the employée représentatives manage to balance satisfac-
torily the interests of their constituency with those of the company as a pro-
fit making enterprise. This requires however, considérable préparation on 
behalf of the employée and trade union représentatives, which the trade 
union organisations provide apparently quite adequately through the trade 
union schools, spécial training courses, research institutions, and spécial 
publications. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS TOWARD CODECISION 
The increasing interest in workers' participation in the décision making 
process of management, has prompted the Commission of the European 
Communities to submit to the Council of Ministers in 1970 a draft statute 
for a European Company "which contains provisions comparable in some 
respects to the System applied in the Fédéral Republic of Germany"15. In 
1972, the Commission prepared a proposai for a Fifth Directive with a view 
to the harmonisation of the laws governing joint stock companies in its 
member States, which included provisions for a similar system of workers' 
participation in the nomination of the members of supervisory boards in 
companies employing at least 500 workers, "either according to a formula 
similar to that in effect in the Fédéral Republic of Germany or according to 
a method comparable to that in force at the présent time in the 
Netherlands"16. The Commission feels, however, that "member States 
must be free to adopt thèse principles with the maximum degree of flexibili-
ty possible and that certain member States must be permitted to allow their 
public companies to approach the objectives in stages"17. 
Developments in the Public Sector 
In the large number of the developed and the developing countries 
there has been some form of workers' participation in the management of 
14 BATSTONE, E., Industhal Democracy: European Expérience, H.M. Stationary Of-
fice, London, 1976, p. 43. 
15 Labour-Management Relations Séries, No. 48, p. 8. 
16 Labour-Management Relations Séries, No. 48, p. 8. 
n E.E.C., "Employée Participation and Company Structure", Bulletin of the European 
Communities Supplément, 8/75, p. 32. 
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the growing public sector of the economy, which includes nationalised in-
dustrial and commercial enterprises, public utilities and other services18. 
(Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Egypt, France, Ghana, India, 
Ireland, Israël, Italy, Mali, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Sri Lanka, 
Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, United Kingdom, Venezuela.) The percen-
tage and the élection or appointment of workers' représentatives in the 
management organs of those enterprises varies from country to country and 
in some cases from undertaking to undertaking, depending on the particular 
government policy and législation, as well as on the capacity of workers 
représentatives to serve in the management organs. 
SELF-MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
Workers* management of undertakings or self-management is the most 
advanced form of workers' control of th£ décision making process of 
management. This form of participation however, présupposes collective 
ownership of the undertaking. 
The best known example of such a System is that of Yugoslavia, which 
was established in the post World War II period. According to the Yugoslav 
system, the work force of the undertaking exercises the principal functions 
of management through the self-management organs which hâve been 
established by the statutes of the undertaking, namely the workers' 
assembly and the workers' council. 
The Workers' Council, which is elected by the personnel of the under-
taking, is entrusted with wide managerial powers. For instance, it adopts 
the internai régulations including those concerning income distribution, 
development plans, employée services and their implementation; it makes 
décisions on investments and approves balance sheets. It elects also the 
director of the undertaking, whom it is unpowered to dismiss, and it sets up 
a management board and a supervisory committee, and a number of other 
specialised committees to which are delegated advisory or décision making 
powers in spécifie fields, including personnel policies and relations, plann-
ing, financial and commercial affairs, etc. 
A number of problems created by over-centralization of power in the 
Yugoslav system, prompted the introduction of rénovations in récent years 
which are aimed at the decentralization of power, and the création of condi-
tions which are conducive to workers' participating more directly in self-
management. 
18 Labour-Management Relations Séries, No. 48, p. 6. 
504 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 34. NO 3 (1979) 
The new principles adopted by the Self-Management Congress of Sera-
jevo in May 1971, were incorporated in the new Fédéral Constitution pro-
mulgated in 1974. On the one hand the implementation of rénovations has 
reinforced the autonomy of undertakings, and on the other, self-
management has been decentralized through the opération of two self-
management organs; in the case of large undertakings, three différent 
levels, namely at the level of the undertaking as a whole, at the level of its 
économie units (plants or establishments), and at the level of its work units 
(shops or departments)19. 
The shop floor assemblies, which now constitute the basic self-
management organs, are empowered to adopt production plans and works' 
rules for the unit, and décide on the distribution of income among the 
workers of the unit, taking into considération the gênerai principles 
established by the workers' council and the légal minimum wages20. 
Other examples of self-management Systems are those of Algeria and 
Peru. In the case of Peru, the Government has decided to apply a System of 
self-management in the sector which is called "social property" and which 
receives initial aid from the State. This is expected to cover eventually more 
than a thousand undertakings, but little is known at the présent of the 
management organs proposed. 
In the case of Algeria, where the Government has pursued a policy of 
promoting workers to become producer-managers since 1965, a Charter and 
a Code of socialist management of undertakings was adopted in 1971. The 
Code provides for the élection of unit assemblies and the undertakings' 
assemblies which are elected from the unit assemblies. Thèse assemblies are 
empowered to assist in the définition of the gênerai policy. They are called 
upon also to supervise the management in the undertaking and to approve 
the balance sheet and the operating accounts. They are called upon also to 
assist the management in the establishment of personnel policies and per-
sonnel department functions. Specialised permanent committees are provid-
ed for to deal with a variety of social, cultural and économie matters, and 
they serve in committees which include an equal number of management 
représentatives that deal with disciplinary matters and safety and health. 
The self-management system in Algeria has been applied experimental-
ly for some time, and apparently it has been made the object of a national 
campaign and discussion intended to explain the functions of the 
assemblies. It was reported however, that the élections for the assemblies 
19 ILO Labour-Management Relations, Séries No. 48. 
20 ILO Labour-Management Relations, Séries N o . 48. 
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scheduled for 1973 had to be postponed for 1974. Judging from the situa-
tion in other developing countries, one of the reasons for the postponement 
and the slow progress made since then was, and still is, the lack of adéquate 
numbers of qualified workers to serve in the undertakings' assemblies and 
the specialised committees. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF WORKERS4 EDUCATION AND 
TRAINING IN EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION AT THE 
LEVEL OF THE UNDERTAKING 
The combined aims of participation and the multidimensional func-
tions of consultative and décision making bodies, create more extensive 
demands on the ability and behaviour of workers' représentatives than 
those required for collective bargaining and grievance procédures. Par-
ticipation has created thus new dimensions in workers' éducation which 
combine a variety of practical and ideological considérations. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the importance of workers' éduca-
tion and training as a prerequisite for successful participation of workers in 
décisions within undertakings, has been recognized and stressed by ail in-
terested parties. This is évident from the responses of national organisations 
to a questionnaire prepared in 1977 by the Workers' Education Branch of 
the I.L.O., and the reports of a number of international conférences and 
seminars which hâve taken place in récent years, including the October 1977 
International Symposium on the Training Requirements of Workers' 
Représentatives for Participation Within Undertakings, which took place in 
Geneva under the auspices of the I.L.O. 
An analysis of sample responses reveals that organizations in the 
developing and the developed countries (both in the market and the marxist 
économies) consider workers' éducation and training an important con-
tributory factor to successful participation. For example, the Swedish Con-
fédération of Trade Unions (LO) regards training and éducation as a "very 
important part of the development of workers' participation within the 
undertakings"21. In the U.S.S.R., the "continuous training of trade union 
functionaries is regarded as a necessary and most important component 
part of their préparation for socio-political activities"22. The Workers 
Education Division of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare of Tan-
21 In response to the Questionnaire prepared by the Labour Education Branch of the 
I.L.O. 
22 Ibid. 
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zania feels that "prerequisite" is too strong a word, but nevertheless, 
"éducation certainly is necessary for a successful implementation of 
workers' participation"23. 
The discussions at the Oslo Symposium on Workers' Participation in 
Décisions within Undertakings (20-20 August 1974) organized by the I.L.O. 
in collaboration with the Norwegian Government, clearly indicated that 
workers' éducation had been identified as "an indispensable déterminant of 
an eventual success of the various schemes of workers' participation"24. A 
workshop on workers' participation in the décision making process of 
management at the International Conférence on Trends in Industrial and 
Labour Relations held in Montréal on May 25-28, 1976, came to the conclu-
sion that "it has become common place to stress the crucial necessity of 
éducation for employées as well as for management in the area of participa-
tion: you cannot participate if you cannot get meaningfully - with 
knowledge - involved in the decision-making process"25. Other interna-
tional seminars and studies hâve corne to similar conclusions, (the OECD 
Seminar on Workers' Participation, the Graz Seminar on the Rôle of Trade 
Union Training within the Scope of Codetermination, and the Trade Union 
Training Survey prepared by the European Association of National Produc-
tivity Centres). 
The contribution of éducation to the success of participation may be 
judged also by the acquired ability of workers' représentatives to balance 
the interests of their constituency with those of the undertaking and society 
as a whole. In the Soviet Union for instance where the trade union commit-
tees represent the interests of ail workers in the undertaking, "it is évident 
that a successful fulfilment by (Soviet) trade unions of their social rôle and 
their functions dépends in many ways of how well trade union functionaries 
know the économie and social laws of the development of society",26 as well 
as "the économies of production and labour, and forms and methods of 
managing enterprises"27. 
In the Fédéral Republic of Germany the extensive educational and in-
formation programmes concerning codetermination which hâve been in ex-
23 Ibid. 
24 I.L.O. Labour-Management Relations, Séries N o . 4 8 . , W o r k e r s ' Par t ic ipat ion in 
Décisions within Under tak ings , Geneva , 1976, p . 54. 
25 International Conférence on Trends in Industrial and Labour Relations, Montréal, 
May 25-28, 1976, Workshop Report by R. BLANPAIN. 
26 From the Soviet Union response to the Quest ionnaire prepared by the workers ' 
Educat ion Branch of the I .L .O . 
27 Ibid. 
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istence for sometime now, hâve contributed to the success of the System 
because they hâve enabled workers' représentatives to participate effectively 
in works' councils and supervisory boards, where they hâve managed ap-
parently to match the interests of the enterprise as a profit making institu-
tion with those of the workers and society as a whole. As it has been men-
tioned previously, foreign observers found that even in the cases of parity 
représentation in supervisory boards, the "conventional business interests 
hâve not been endangered"28. 
Effective educational programmes concerning an existent or a propos-
ed System of participation, may also help to overcome the apathy or intran-
sigency of certain groups and especially those among the younger généra-
tion of workers, and contribute thus to the change of attitudes which is an 
important prerequisite for the success of any participative System. 
Apathy and intransigency, which affect adversely coopération, in-
dustrial peace and productivity, dérive to a considérable extent from 
frustration, disillusionment, and aliénation caused by uncontrolled 
technological change and automation, and the détérioration of the working 
environment. In certain market économies the problem is accentuated by 
the fact that the development of consumption values on the one hand, and 
the development of greater éducation and sophistication on the other, hâve 
created much greater expectations among the young workers; this causes 
them to demand much more from work and living. In their quest for fulfil-
ment, they become impatient with authoritarian and old-fashioned manage-
ment which does little to improve the working environment and this in turn, 
makes them apathetic or uncooperative and agressive. They may also turn 
against the established leadership of trade unions if it concentrâtes only on 
limited gains and does not develop wider and more definite social and 
économie objectives29. 
The young workers in the United States for instance, are legitimately in 
revolt against the "trappings of nineteenth century employer colonialism, 
piddling and demeaning work rules, time clocks, oppressive, overwatchful 
supervisors, and jobs which imply they are but an extension of the 
machine"30. 
28 B A T S T O N E , E. , Indus trial Democracy: European Expérience, H . M. Stat ionary Of-
fice, London , 1976, p . 43 . 
29 B R O W N , W . A . (Rappor teur) , "Collective Bargaining in Trans i t i on" , Report of a 
Conférence at Ditchley Park, Nov. 14-17, 1969, The Ditchley Founda t ion , Enstone, England, 
p . 10. 
30 SAYLES, Léonard, " J o b Enrichment : Little Tha t ' s New, and Right for the Wrong 
Reasons" , Industrial Relations Research Association Séries, Proceedings of the 26th Annual 
Winter Meeting, New York, Dec. 28-29, 1971, pp. 202-3. 
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For similar reasons the younger génération of workers in Japan hâve 
changed their attitudes towards both management and organised labour. 
The "dual loyalty" they hâve had for their employer s and trade unions, it 
has now developed into a "dual apathy"^. 
In some marxist countries of Eastern Europe, the problems of worker 
dissatisfaction appear also to occur in terms of high turnover rates and 
absenteeism, especially among younger workers. That is why, "con-
sidérable interest has been shown in studies of worker motivation and 
methods of promoting worker participation in décisions at the shop-floor 
level and better opportunities for self-fulfilment, as an antidote to thèse 
trends"32. 
International expériences indicate therefore, that workers must be con-
vinced first, through effective programmes of information and éducation, 
that among other things, participation would cure some of the aforemen-
tioned ills of uncontrolled technological change and automation, and the 
détérioration of the working environment. It is only then that they become 
coopérative and willing to support participation. 
THE WAY AHEAD FOR CANADA 
Industrial democracy in the form of employées' participation in 
management, has become the subject of serious study in Canada by 
académies and other parties concerned in récent years, and although 
employée représentation in co-decision bodies is still a topic of intellectual 
discussion, and occasional Government interest only, the deep-seated 
underlying forces and necessities will soon make such proposais a realistic 
concern for action. However, as the Chairman of Unilever Limited, David 
Orr, has observed recently, "to hâve any chance of success, participation 
has to start at the grass roots". Furthermore, "without a high degree of 
consensus, attempts to transfer Systems for regulating human institutions 
can cause problems of assimilation and end in total rejection by those who 
were expected to benefit"33. His recommendations therefore are similar to 
31 SHIRAISHI, T., "Workers' Participation in Décisions Within Undertakings in 
Japan" Symposium on Workers Participation in Décisions within Undertakings, Oslo, 20-30 
August 1974, I.L.O., Geneva, 1974. 
32 I.L.O., Labour-Management Relations, Séries No. 48, "Workers' Participation in 
Décisions within Undertakings", Oslo Symposium, I.L.O., Geneva, 1976, p. 31. 
33 ORR, David, "Employée Représentation and Coopération", Harvard Business 
Review, January-February, 1977. 
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that of the officiai recommendations of the E.E.C. Commission, which 
leaves the degree and formula of participation and the pace of implementa-
tion to the discrétion of the individual member States that can best adopt 
the proposed Systems of participation to national realities. 
In the présent day Canadian realities, the question of employées' par-
ticipation at the industry level would be easier perhaps to deal with - if it 
becomes part of an agreed "package" - which may include provisions for 
participation in the formulation of socio-economic policies, at the provin-
cial and national levels. Expérience supports the contention that there is a 
relationship between employées' participation at the industry level and ef-
fective tripartite coopération at the national level, because industrial 
democracy at the level of the undertakings enhances labour-management 
coopération and concerted action for the solution of national problems. 
More specifically, the success of the German co-determination System and 
its bénéficiai contribution to social and économie stability, provides not on-
ly tangible évidence of viability for lower as well as for higher levels of 
employées' participation, but also évidence of its contribution to reasonable 
wage settlements and to effective coopération over national économie 
policy. 
Expérience has shown also that one of the most important factors for 
the success of the existing Systems of participation, has been the spécial 
training and éducation of workers in gênerai and of the trade union activists 
in particular, which has enabled them to participate effectively in various 
consultative and décision making bodies, where they hâve been executing 
their duties with ail the required knowledge and responsibility. This has in 
fact produced a balanced situation in the private sector of industry, where 
the interests of the enterprise as a profit making institution, are fairly well 
matched vis-a-vis the interests of employées and society as a whole. 
On the other hand, management in gênerai and the représentatives of 
employer organizations in particular, hâve become accustomed to working 
together with trade unionists for the solution of problems of mutual con-
cern inside and outside the enterprises, and consequently they consider the 
labour représentatives as partners with whom they are bound to disagree oc-
casionally, rather than unrelenting enemies with whom they must always 
engage in battle. 
The long term solution of the current Canadian économie problems re-
quires, inter a/la, wage and price restraints, prolonged industrial peace and 
increased productivity. The former may be achieved through a new AIB 
programme, but the European expériences indicate that the latter can only 
be achieved through the introduction of a comprehensive incomes policy 
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based on tripartite coopération and consensus, and enhanced by par-
ticipatory democracy at the level of the undertakings. 
The expériences of certain successful West European practices in 
employee's participation within undertakings recommends the establish-
ment of complementary institutional arrangements in the existing System of 
labour-management relations in Canada which, at the présent, is based only 
on the institution of collective bargaining. The institutionalization of par-
ticipation in the décision making process of management, is expected to 
contribute more effectively to the solution of problems of mutual concern, 
and enhance thus the spirit and scope of coopération. 
There is little doubt now that employee's participation would be 
adopted by most Western European countries and that Canada will hâve to 
follow suite if it is to improve the quality of working life and increase pro-
ductivity, improving thus its compétitive position in the international 
market. Some form of participation would become, therefore, a reality in 
the next décade, and the intérim period provides companies with a useful 
breathing space in which managements can take stock, analyse their own 
strengths and weaknesses, and décide on how best to widen joint régulation 
or co-decision-making within their organizations, and to influence govern-
ment législation accordingly. 
According to the British personnel management consultant, Nancy 
Taylor, there are four main lines of approach that companies can take: 
1) Supervisory boards/employée directors. 
2) Extension of areas of collective bargaining. 
3) Systems of joint councils or committees at various levels and 
with extended scope. 
4) Work restructuring. 
A company may opt for any or ail four of any combination of thèse ap-
proaches under proposed or enabling législation, but there should be viabili-
ty studies to décide what the best choice is for a particular company - or 
where and how to start, given existing circumstances. This is one area when 
borrowing wholesale from other countries or other companies' practices 
could be disastrous, "because one is not dealing with narrow techniques but 
rather with the changing of a way of live"34. 
34 TAYLOR, Nancy, "Time to Prépare for Participation", Personnel Management, 
London, August 1976. 
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In the breathing space offered, there is an excellent opportunity for the 
large and médium size companies in Canada to mount joint investigational 
studies, and in the process, learn how to solve problems of mutual concern 
jointly, with the minimum of unnecessary conflict. Getting together 
management/union teams may not be too difficult, especially if they are 
joined by Government représentatives and/or independent experts. 
In brief, the task of the proposed joint study teams, would be to ex-
amine both the needs as well as the constraints of: 
a) company technology, its objectives and operational problems; 
b) management policies and practices, including Systems of control 
and styles of managing; 
c) employée attitudes and expectations; 
d) industrial relations processes and procédures; 
e) external pressures of markets, fiscal policies and other législative 
measures, social and political values; and 
f) the educational and training requirements of employées for par-
ticipation. 
Companies which feel that they hâve not the resources required for this 
task, may obtain outside assistance from the appropriate research depart-
ments of the Provincial Governments, the manufacturers' associations, and 
the collèges and universities. However, there must still be a minimum but 
high level of involvement of the companies' own personnel and trade union 
représentatives, if the proposed studies are to hâve a successful translation 
into practice. The important thing is to make a start while there is still time 
to initiate rather than merely react to eventual législation and compliance 
with Fédéral and /or Provincial policies and directives. 
Parallel to any joint investigational studies that labour and 
managements may décide to pursue at the undertaking and/or industry 
level, the relative success of the union-management conférences which hâve 
been sponsored in récent years by the Fédéral Department of Labour, in-
dicate also the desirability of extending thèse conférences into week-long 
joint study courses with the support and coopération of the provincial 
governments and a selected group of higher educational institutions. 
Both of the above outlined study and learning processes, would not on-
ly help to solve some immédiate problems of mutual concern including 
health and safety, but they would also create the necesary preconditions for 
the eventual establishment and success of permanent coopérative bodies at 
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the industry and national levels, irrespective of the method and source of 
their introduction. 
In the final analysis, the urgency of concerted action by ail parties con-
cerned in this field, does not dérive only from the need of preparing to com-
ply eventually with public policies and directives, but also from the urgent 
over-riding need of reducing conflict and of improving the productivity per-
formance of industrial enterprises, in order to increase the competitiveness 
of their products in the international market, and make thus a positive con-
tribution to the effort against stagflation. 
La participation des employés à la direction: 
expériences internationales et perspectives canadiennes 
Quelques pays du monde occidental, y compris le Canada, ont fait l'expérience, 
depuis le milieu de la décennie 1960, d'un état aigu de conflits industriels et d'une 
performance pitoyable en matière de productivité à un moment où la paix in-
dustrielle et l'augmentation de la productivité s'imposent dans la lutte à une stagna-
tion persistante. Ces faits brutaux sont aussi atterrants que convaincants. Le nombre 
et la fréquence des grèves, des lock-out et autres formes d'arrêts de travail ont aug-
menté à un taux alarmant, en particulier dans les secteurs stratégiques de l'économie, 
et le taux d'accroissement de la productivité laisse beaucoup à désirer. 
La productivité est contrée non seulement par la perte directe de production, qui 
résulte des arrêts de travail, mais aussi par des formes variées de ralentissement, l'ac-
croissement de l'absentéisme, le fini du travail et les dommages à l'équipement et aux 
matériaux. L'explication que quelques spécialistes apportent à cette contestation 
croissante, c'est que, sous les pressions de l'inflation, syndicats et directions se sont 
retranchés d'une façon inflexible sur leurs positions respectives, tandis que d'autres 
ont tendance à attribuer en grande partie l'agitation industrielle, pendant les derniè-
res années, au militantisme de gauche. Cependant, la plupart des experts s'accordent 
à dire que ce record de conflits industriels, depuis plus de dix ans maintenant, indi-
que avant tout que nous vivions avec ce malaise longtemps avant les pressions des 
dernières années et que, d'autre part, le militantisme syndical ne correspond pas 
nécessairement à l'agitation politique des groupes de gauche. Le record des conflits 
en Australie, au Canada, en Irlande et aux États-Unis, par exemple, où, au point de 
vue idéologique, les syndicats peuvent être considérés comme modérés ou conser-
vateurs, est aussi mauvais que celui de l'Italie, où les communistes et les socialistes de 
gauche dominent la plupart des syndicats. D'autre part, la situation des grèves en 
France où les communistes dominent aussi les plus importantes centrales syndicales, 
est presque aussi bonne que celle du Japon, des pays Scandinaves et de l'Allemagne. 
On peut trouver la réponse à ces contradictions dans les causes sous-jacentes de 
conflit et dans les aspects antagonistes de systèmes de relations professionnelles 
fondés sur la contestation plutôt que sur la coopération entre syndicats et 
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employeurs, non dans l'orientation idéologique des syndicats. Les expériences inter-
nationales indiquent que les radicaux tirent profit du mécontentement, mais qu'ils 
n'en sont pas la cause. En de tels cas, les divergences entre patrons et syndicats en 
matière de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux sont accentuées par une forte 
méfiance mutuelle et, ainsi, leurs positions respectives deviennent plus rigides. Il est 
alors presque impossible d'en arriver à un règlement facile et raisonnable en matière 
de salaires ou même de trouver des solutions mutuellement acceptables à des pro-
blèmes d'intérêt commun. 
Au cours de la dernière décennie, il est devenu manifeste que le système de 
négociations collectives, à lui seul, ne peut régler effectivement plusieurs des pro-
blèmes compliqués créés par les déplacements de production et l'introduction incon-
trôlée de changements technologiques et d'automation (lesquels ont été accom-
pagnés d'une augmentation du chômage structurel), la frustration et l'aliénation 
d'importants secteurs de la main-d'oeuvre (suite à la détérioration de l'ambiance de 
travail), le développement d'un sens accru de la justice sociale et la recherche de la 
perfection, principalement parmi la plus jeune génération de travailleurs. Ce qui est 
remis en question, par conséquent, ce n'est pas l'apport de la négociation collective 
dans la fixation des salaires et l'amélioration des conditions de vie, mais l'incapacité 
de faire face à la multiplicité des problèmes au lieu même du travail qui ont accentué 
l'État de conflit et diminué la productivité. La solution à ces questions exige une con-
sultation et des ententes entre employeurs et salariés qui soient périodiques, sinon 
constantes, ententes que les accords de négociations collectives (une fois tous les 
deux ou les trois ans) ne peuvent pas vraiment comprendre. 
L'expérience a démontré que la solution se trouve dans l'amélioration générale 
des relations professionnelles et le développement de dispositifs institutionnels com-
plémentaires, non dans l'abolition du système de négociations collectives qui, dans 
une atmosphère de bonnes relations, peut encore contribuer au règlement raison-
nable des questions salariales. Une étude comparative du système de relations profes-
sionnelles dans les pays du monde occidental, de la situation qui y existe en matière 
de grèves et de productivité et de l'état de leurs économies incite à considérer 
sérieusement l'introduction de certains mécanismes institutionnels complémentaires 
au système de négociations collectives et aux dispositifs d'arbitrage, qui seraient de 
nature à favoriser la coopération entre salariés et employeurs en vue de la solution 
des problèmes d'intérêt mutuel. Ceci aurait pour effet, en retour, de réduire les con-
flits, d'accroître la productivité et d'améliorer les chances de règlement normal des 
questions salariales. 
De tels dispositifs tournent autour d'une certaine forme de participation des tra-
vailleurs à la gestion et se classent dans la catégorie générale de ce qu'on appelle la 
démocratie industrielle. Bien que ces mécanismes institutionnels de participation 
diffèrent quant à leur amplitude et à leurs fonctions, ils ont fondamentalement les 
mêmes buts qui sont idéologiques autant que pratiques. En d'autres mots, les objec-
tifs de la participation sont d'améliorer la qualité de la vie au travail, de diminuer 
l'intensité des conflits industriels, d'accroître la productivité et de créer les condi-
tions préalables à une coopération efficace des parties à l'extérieur du milieu de 
travail par la formulation et l'implantation d'une politique socio-économique publi-
que. 
Beaucoup de pays industrialisés ou en voie de développement ont établi ou pro-
jettent d'implanter la participation ouvrière par législation ou dans les conventions 
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collectives, mais le degré et l'ampleur de la participation et le type d'institutions 
mises en place varient d'un pays à l'autre et parfois d'une industrie à l'autre. Cepen-
dant, en dépit de cette diversité, on peut noter certaines similitudes institutionnelles 
et fonctionnelles, au moins dans la plupart des pays industrialisés et quelques pays en 
voie de développement. Ces similitudes se retrouvent principalement dans les institu-
tions de participation dites «représentatives» ou de niveau inférieur qui touchent aux 
trois principaux aspects de la coopération entre employeurs et salariés, soit Vinfor-
mation, la consultation et Vapprobation. 
Ces institutions de participation à l'échelon inférieur sont, par conséquent, des 
corps consultatifs, et on les retrouve surtout en Europe (bien qu'il y ait des corps 
consultatifs semblables ailleurs dans le monde). On les désigne toujours sous les 
noms de «comité de travailleurs», «conseil des travailleurs», ou de «comités syndi-
caux» (dans les pays marxistes). Nombre de questions sont débattues dans ces 
«conseils de travailleurs» en vue d'en arriver à un consensus ou d'«influencer» les 
décisions de la direction. 
D'autre part, les institutions de participation au niveau supérieur sont des 
«organismes de gestion» où les représentants des travailleurs siègent aux bureaux de 
direction des entreprises privées aussi bien que publiques. En 1970, la République 
fédérale d'Allemagne était le seul pays en Europe occidentale où les représentants des 
employés siégeaient aux bureaux de direction. Aujourd'hui, la loi des compagnies de 
l'Autriche, du Danemark, du Luxembourg, de la Hollande, de la Norvège et de la 
Suède prévoit aussi une représentation semblable. En outre, plusieurs pays en voie de 
développement et la plupart des autres pays européens se proposent d'instituer ou 
d'augmenter la participation aux degrés inférieurs ou supérieurs par mesure législa-
tive ou par des conventions collectives cadre. La CEE a mis de l'avant une directive 
qui rend la participation obligatoire pour tous ses membres. Toutefois, la vitesse et le 
degré de participation ont été laissés à la discrétion de chaque État membre. 
Ce qui est important de noter, toutefois, c'est que le succès de la participation 
des travailleurs à la gestion exige plusieurs conditions préalables, y compris l'inten-
sité de désir à la participation, le comportement de toutes les parties intéressées, 
l'éducation et la formation des salariés en vue de la participation et le degré d'appui 
des syndicats existants. 
Il en fait peu de doute maintenant que la participation des salariés sera adoptée 
par la plupart des pays d'Europe occidentale et que le Canada devra suivre s'il désire 
améliorer la qualité de la vie au travail et accroître la productivité, améliorer ainsi sa 
position concurrentielle sur les marchés internationaux. Une forme quelconque de 
participation deviendrait, par conséquent, une réalité durant la prochaine décennie 
et la période intermédiaire donne aux entreprises le temps de respirer pendant lequel 
la direction peut scruter la situation, analyser ses points forts et ses points faibles et 
décider comment elle pourrait le mieux accroître les réglementations conjointes ou 
les processus de décision à l'intérieur des entreprises, tout en influençant en consé-
quence la législation. 
Les compagnies qui estiment ne pas avoir les ressources requises pour accomplir 
cette tâche, peuvent obtenir de l'aide de l'extérieur auprès des services de recherche 
appropriés des gouvernements provinciaux, des associations de manufacturieurs, des 
collèges et des universités. Cependant, il doit y avoir en outre un haut degré 
d'engagement de la part du personnel des entreprises et des représentants syndicaux 
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pour que des méthodes préconisées passent dans la pratique. Ce qui est important, 
c'est de se mettre au travail pendant qu'il est encore temps de prendre l'initiative 
plutôt que de simplement réagir et de se soumettre à la législation fédérale ou aux 
politiques et directives des provinces. 
Parallèlement à tout étude en profondeur que les travailleurs et les employeurs 
peuvent décider de poursuivre au niveau de l'entreprise ou de l'industrie, le succès 
relatif des conférences patronales-ouvrières que le ministère fédéral du travail a of-
fertes au cours des dernières années indique aussi qu'il est souhaitable de 
transformer ces conférences en cours permanents avec l'appui des gouvernements 
provinciaux et en coopération avec eux de même qu'avec des institutions d'enseigne-
ment supérieur. 
Ceci ne ferait pas qu'aider à résoudre les problèmes immédiats d'intérêt mutuel, 
y compris la santé et la sécurité, mais créerait aussi les conditions préalables à l'éta-
blissement éventuel et aux succès d'organismes de coopération permanents à l'échelle 
de l'industrie et de l'économie nationale, indépendamment de la méthode et de 
l'origine de l'implantation. 
Enfin, l'urgence d'une action concertée de toutes les parties intéressées ne 
découle pas uniquement de la nécessité de se préparer à se soumettre aux politiques et 
aux directives publiques, mais aussi de l'urgence nécessité d'atténuer les conflits et 
d'améliorer le rendement des entreprises industrielles afin d'accroître la concurrence 
de leurs produits sur les marchés internationaux et de contribuer ainsi d'une façon 
positive à la lutte contre la stagnation. 
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